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Abstract  The staff play a key part in designing IMF conditionality, and yet the literature 
provides a narrow view of their motivations.   This article shows how the design of IMF 
conditionality is linked to the normative orientations of the staff and their common 
professional training.  Professional ties from similar training help to bind the staff together 
around a shared set of normative orientations that inform the IMF’s policy goals.  When 
borrowing country officials do not share these orientations, the staff are motivated to tighten 
conditionality.  This behavior also fits with staff concerns about time-inconsistency and 
moral hazard.  I find robust statistical support for this argument using a dataset based on the 
professional ties that exist between the IMF staff and borrowing country officials.   Yet 
conditionality is not found to be more lenient when country officials share the normative 
orientations of the IMF staff.  Staff concerns about time-inconsistent preferences and moral 
hazard likely weigh against more lenient treatment where normative adherence is stronger.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: International Monetary Fund, organizational culture, conditionality, ideas, 
professions, developing countries 
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The International Monetary Fund’s (hereafter IMF or Fund) use of conditionality is 
highly controversial.   Critics claim IMF conditionality has a one-size-fits-all logic that 
constrains the policy options available to borrowing countries (Easterly 2001; Stiglitz 2002; 
Gabor 2010; Weisbrot et al. 2009; Van Waeyenberge et al. 2010; Rainer and Raudla 2013).  
Others direct similar criticisms toward bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade and 
investment (Wade 2003; Gallagher 2005; 2011; Shadlen 2005; Grabel 2010; Broad and 
Cavanagh 2014).   These criticisms share a concern that these institutions are infused with a 
normative bias that has severely limited the space for alternative policy goals in developing 
countries.   
Some emerging market officials share this view as well as a perception that IMF 
conditionality, with its alleged bias toward Western interests, tends to be applied in an uneven 
manner.
1
   Countries of importance to the West are perceived to receive favourable treatment, 
while others receive tougher conditions.  Recent IMF lending to countries in the Eurozone 
has only served to heighten such criticisms and negative perceptions.   Questions about the 
potential biases associated with IMF conditionality, and more broadly about the behavior of 
international organizations (IOs), are thus of much importance to scholars and policymakers.    
For scholars, questions about the behaviour of international organizations are situated 
within a broader debate between rationalists and constructivists (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004; Hawkins et al 2006).    Rationalists and constructivists both see potential biases arising 
the policies of IOs, but they highlight different sources of such behavior.    While rationalists 
emphasize the material interests and incentives of shareholders, borrowing countries, and 
organizational staff, constructivists tend to highlight the worldviews and norms of these 
actors.   Notwithstanding some recent constructivist inroads, rationalism tends to be the 
                                                 
1
 See also Independent Evaluation Office (2007a; 2010) and Steinwand and Stone (2008) on the IMF’s uneven 
treatment of countries. 
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predominant approach in the now extensive literature on IMF conditionality (Steinwand and 
Stone 2008).   This scholarship often attributes preferential treatment found in IMF 
conditionality to the geopolitical and economic interests of powerful shareholders (Dreher 
and Jensen 2007; Kang 2007; Stone 2008; 2011; Copelovitch 2010).   
Along with the interests of powerful shareholders, the IMF staff also exercise a great 
deal of influence over the design of conditionality (Mussa and Savastano 1999; Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Martin 2006).  The key judgment the staff make in designing conditionality 
is assessing the credibility of a borrowing country’s intentions to fulfil its policy 
commitments.  Here rationalist arguments focus solely on the technocratic considerations or 
organizational imperatives motivating staff judgments.         
    I argue that the manner in which the IMF staff evaluate the credibility of borrowing 
country policy commitments is subject to a range of influences, including but not limited to 
considerations and imperatives featured in rationalist accounts.   Building on constructivist 
analyses of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005b; Broome 2010; Chwieroth 
2010), I contribute a new argument on the determinants of conditionality that emphasizes the 
normative orientations of the IMF staff.   I contend that a borrowing country’s affinity for the 
IMF staff’s normative orientations shapes the binding nature of conditionality.      As such, 
the argument here extends Woods (2006) suggestion that conditionality is partly shaped by 
the adherence of borrowing country officials to IMF norms.   
 The international normative environment is an important influence on  the design of 
conditionality (Pop-Eleches 2008; 2009).  In addition to technocratic considerations and 
organizational imperatives, the judgments of the IMF staff also reflect their normative 
orientations, which are heavily influenced by their common professional training from 
Anglo-American economic departments (Babb 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Woods 
2006).   This common training helps to instil the IMF staff with a particular way of 
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understanding the policies necessary to stabilize economies, providing at least one 
mechanism through which professional ties emerge among actors.    As Cortell and Peterson 
observe (2006:260), “staff who share a common professional identity are likely…to develop 
a similar ‘logic of appropriateness’ as their professional roles become the lenses through 
which they view the IO’s [international organization] mandate.”   
Professional ties emerging from common training thus inform how the staff evaluate 
the credibility of borrowing country policy commitments.     Weak professional ties 
undermine staff confidence that the government shares their normative orientations.   When 
borrowing country officials appear unsympathetic to the staff’s normative orientations, and 
thus demonstrating a weaker commitment to IMF policy goals, the staff may perceive a 
greater need to make any policy adjustments explicitly binding.   Weaker normative 
adherence to IMF policy goals thus induces more stringent conditionality.  By raising the 
costs of reneging on IMF policy goals, tighter conditionality provides a stronger commitment 
device to shape the direction of policy reform.    
I use a dataset of the professional training characteristics of over 200 IMF staff 
members and over 400 officials from 32 developing country officials to test this argument.   
The results provide strong evidence that professional ties shape the binding nature of IMF 
conditionality.    In cases where professional ties between the staff and borrowing country 
officials are weak, countries receive more binding conditions in their IMF programs.      
However, stronger professional tries do not lead to more lenient treatment.      Staff concerns 
about time-inconsistency and moral hazard may offset the inclination to provide preferential 
treatment where normative adherence is stronger.   
 
PROFESSIONAL TIES AND BINDING CONDITIONALITY 
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 Scholarship on IOs is often situated as divided between rationalists and 
constructivists.   In explaining the motivations of shareholders, borrowing countries, and 
organizational staff, rationalist approaches tend to focus on material interests and incentives.  
While insightful, these arguments tend to suffer from one of two shortcomings.   The first is 
to ignore staff preferences entirely, focusing instead on the political interests and structures of 
shareholder and borrowing countries.    The second shortcoming is to account for staff 
preferences only with reference to technocratic considerations or organizational imperatives.     
 The literature on IMF lending, which is largely rationalist in orientation, has not been 
immune to these shortcomings.   Existing scholarship, which highlights technocratic 
considerations (Bird and Rowlands 2003; Martin 2006:142), the geopolitical and economic 
interests of powerful states (Dreher and Jensen 2007; Kang 2007; Stone 2008; 2011; 
Copelovitch 2010), domestic political features (Vreeland 2003) as well as organizational 
imperatives within the IMF (Willett 2002; Dreher and Vaubel 2004), provides few answers as 
to how the normative orientations of the staff may shape the design of IMF conditionality. 
The argument here aims to rectify this shortcoming in the literature by highlighting the 
importance of the worldviews and norms of those on either side of an IMF loan.     I offer a 
conditional theory of how normative adherence to IMF policy goals informs staff judgments 
about the credibility of a borrowing country’s policy commitments, and hence the design of 
conditionality.   
 Country representatives on the IMF Executive Board approve all loans, but they have 
delegated considerable authority and agenda-setting power in designing conditionality to the 
staff (Mussa and Savastano 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).   The Board considers only 
those loans that the staff have designed and submitted to them, and it has almost never 
rejected or modified a loan proposal (Southard 1979; Martin 2006).   Of course, as Stone 
(2008; 2011) and others (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Kang 2007; 
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Copelovitch 2010; Breen, 2012) have shown, this does not mean that governments fail to 
influence the design of IMF programs.   Powerful states, including but not limited to the 
United States, are capable of influencing the design of loan programs through informal 
contacts with the management and staff throughout the loan negotiation process.  Moreover, 
when designing a program the staff must take into account the preferences of powerful 
member states if a program is to secure approval from the Executive Board.     Yet programs 
are often the product of the staff, particularly when the preferences of powerful member 
states display considerable heterogeneity (Martin 2006; Copelovitch 2010).  
 In addition to this agenda-setting power, organizational procedures, though somewhat 
standardized, also leave the staff, particularly those in the regionally organized area 
departments responsible for relations with member states, with considerable discretion in the 
design of IMF programs.   IMF guidelines on conditionality, first outlined in 1979, explicitly 
state that there can be no general rule as to the number and content of binding conditions 
because of the diversity of challenges and institutional arrangements in borrowing countries 
(IMF 1998).
2
  Moreover, while IMF management (the Managing Director and Deputy 
Managing Directors) makes the final decision about the design of a program, like the Board, 
it rarely makes any changes to the features agreed by the area department mission (Mussa and 
Savastano 1999:12).  
 The literature identifies two primary determinants of staff preferences: technocratic 
considerations and organizational imperatives.   The former sees macroeconomic conditions 
determining the design of conditionality (Bird and Rowlands 2003).   The latter views staff 
incentives to maximize their resources or the likelihood of program success as a leading 
determinant of conditionality (Willett 2002; Dreher and Vaubel 2004).  When demand for 
IMF resources grows, the staff may use this as an opportunity to gain greater influence 
                                                 
2
 This guideline on conditionality has been reaffirmed in each subsequent review, the most recent of which was 
in 2012. 
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through more stringent conditionality.   Alternatively, the staff may engage in “hurry up” 
lending during reviews of the organization’s financing capacity as a way to generate pressure 
on its member states to provide it with more resources.   Such lending may lead to the 
relaxation of conditionality so as to entice more borrowers.   
 Much of this literature omits another possibility, which is that the normative 
orientations found in the IMF’s organizational culture may also be an important determinant 
of the design of conditionality (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005b).  The shared 
socializing experience of professional training in Anglo-American economics departments  - 
which rests of a theoretical core stressing market efficiency and rationality - has helped instil 
in the Fund staff a shared way of forming policy judgments (Babb 2003; Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005a; Woods 2006; Chwieroth 2010).   Common professional 
training exposes and socializes individuals to particular technical knowledge (causal 
understandings) and normative conceptualizations (standards of behaviour) by promoting, 
both implicitly and explicitly, a particular set of beliefs. “Professional training,” observe 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:905), “does more than simply transfer technical knowledge, it 
actively socializes people to value certain things above others.”     
These technical knowledge and normative conceptualizations - which Johnston (2005) 
calls “cognitive worldviews” and “constitutive norms” - provide a common lens through 
which IMF economists develop shared diagnoses about the problems economies face, the 
kinds of information relevant to understanding these problems, and the array of possible and 
appropriate policies to remedy them.   As DiMaggio and Powell (1983:153) observe, 
“[Those] drawn from the same universities and filtered on a common set of attributes…will 
tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures and structures as 
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the same way.”   
Indeed, as discussed below, a wealth of evidence from surveys of economists reveals the 
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importance of the socializing experience associated with professional training.    By acquiring 
positions within relevant bureaucracies, these like-minded professionals shape organizational 
policy through what Dimaggio and Powell (1983) call “normative isomorphism.”3      
Some caveats are in order before proceeding.  I do not claim that professional ties 
necessarily require either common professional training or shared policy beliefs.    As the 
literature on network ties and linked ecologies suggests, such ties can emerge from a range of 
sources including but not limited to those explored here (Abbott 2005; Kahler 2009; 
Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009).   Moreover, not all individuals are socialized by their 
professional training experience.    Behind the pattern of shared beliefs emerging from 
professional training there might be some individuals who were socialized into these beliefs 
and others whose prior beliefs led them to self-select into particular academic programs.      
Yet even those individuals who did self-select into particular academic programs were 
likely exposed to new technical knowledge and normative conceptualizations that, at the very 
least, reinforced their prior beliefs or led them to extend their beliefs in a way they had not 
yet considered. Over time the belief structure of these individuals likely became increasingly 
robustly embedded in a particular set of shared beliefs, with such beliefs being constantly 
reshaped and redefined via interaction with other members of the group who shared them.   
Moreover, while it would be an overstatement to claim that common professional training 
produces a set of completely homogenous beliefs within the IMF, it, along with 
organizational procedures encouraging conformity, have helped create a common set of 
general assumptions about “how things are done” within the IMF that are generally shared by 
most staff.  
  I argue that the staff draw on their common professional training to design 
conditionality.   This training shapes the contours of the adjustments that the staff are likely 
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 Scholars of epistemic communities describe a similar process; see Adler and Haas (1992) and Haas (1992).  
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to view as necessary to encourage more disciplined macroeconomic policies and to remove 
structural impediments to economic growth.   The Fund staff thus believe that program 
success is dependent on certain policies.    
When a government requests an IMF program the staff must assess the credibility of 
its policy intentions in forming their expectations and making judgments about how to design 
conditionality.
4
   Governments face a time-inconsistency problem.  Even governments that 
want to implement policy reforms – and therefore have a long-run incentive to pursue such 
measures – face incentives to renege on these intentions and assume greater risk in order to 
achieve short-term political or economic objectives.   Thus, the staff must evaluate a 
government’s policy intentions as well as the credibility of these intentions, and consider how 
this shapes the potential for moral hazard.        
Here professional ties may make this task easier as it communicates that the policy 
team may (or may not) have some affinity for the IMF’s policy goals and thus have stronger 
(or weaker) intentions to reform.  Weaker professional ties between government officials and 
the Fund staff may provide a signal that the borrowing country is unsympathetic to the IMF’s 
policy goals.    Thus, when the professional characteristics of the IMF staff and borrowing 
country officials display little similarity, the Fund is likely to extend loans with more binding 
conditions so as to help cement more credible policy commitments and reform.  Put simply, if 
borrowing country officials do not share the policy beliefs of the IMF, the staff insist upon 
more constraints.       
This behavior fits with staff normative orientation and concerns about time-
inconsistency and moral hazard but aligns less easily with organizational imperatives to 
maximize the likelihood of program success.   The staff may believe that program success is 
dependent on certain policies and thus requires tighter conditionality for borrowers 
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 See the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) on credibility theory.   
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unsympathetic to the IMF’s policy goals.   Yet programs with a higher number of binding 
conditions experience a greater tendency to fail (Bird and Willet 2004; Bird 2009).  As such, 
this behavior may prove counterproductive and create organizational pathologies within the 
IMF (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005a).     
How might the IMF staff treat borrowers where professional ties with government 
officials appear stronger?  Woods (2006) suggests the IMF may be inclined to support 
sympathetic interlocutors in borrowing countries.  Others go further by arguing that the IMF 
plays favorites by providing preferential treatment in the design of conditionality to those 
countries whose officials share the organization’s policy preferences (Nelson 2014b).  
Credible commitment arguments suggest that borrowing country officials that share the 
policy beliefs of the IMF would require fewer constraints.      Hence, one might conjecture 
that the Fund would be inclined to treat borrowers more leniently where professional ties are 
stronger.    
The presence of these similarly trained officials may communicate that the 
government shares the IMF’s policy goals and thus can be trusted to follow the IMF’s 
preferred set of policies.     Chwieroth (2013a), for instance, finds that the IMF provides 
larger loans to countries where government officials share professional ties with the staff.   If 
this logic also applies to policy conditionality, then we would expect the Fund to provide 
loans with fewer binding conditions to borrowers where country officials share stronger 
professional ties with the staff. 
TESTING THE ARGUMENT 
 
 
In this section, I assess how professional ties shape the design of IMF conditionality.   
The data set comprises annual data on 81 IMF non-concessional loans extended to 22 
developing countries from 1983 to 1998 under the Stand-By and Extended Fund Facility 
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programs.
5
     I measure conditionality using a count of the number of binding conditions 
included in an IMF program when it is first approved.   These data, which originate from 
Copelovitch (2010), provide a widely used measure of the overall stringency of conditionality 
(Gould 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Stone 2011; Breen 2012).       
I focus on performance criteria, which are the most binding form of conditionality.
6
   
These criteria are mandatory quantitative or structural conditions, such as limits on 
government debt or privatising state-owned enterprises, which borrowers must be implement 
to access IMF resources. In the data set the mean number of performance criteria included in 
IMF loans has shown little variation over time (approximately six).   However, there has been 
notable divergence across various borrowers, with the number ranging from 0 to 14. 
I use data from Chwieroth (2013a) to test the argument.  Measuring policy beliefs is a 
challenging task, and my approach (Chwieroth 2007; 2010; 2013a) and that of others (Kogut 
and MacPherson 2008; Weymouth and MacPherson 2012) has been to use the professional 
training characteristics of policymakers as a proxy for normative consensus.  While there may 
be better approaches for capturing shared beliefs, such as direct surveys of IMF and country 
officials, these are empirically near impossible.      However, there is abundant evidence from 
surveys of economists that provides support for the validity of this approach, as it reveals 
common professional training to be an important socializing experience in generating shared 
beliefs (Colander and Klamer 1987; Klamer and Colander 1990; Colander 2008; Fourcade 
2009).  This evidence also shows that even though consensus does not extend to all areas of 
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 Data availability constraints on IMF staff profiles prevent the time-series of the analysis from extending 
beyond 1998.   However, this time frame does permit analysis of the period when the IMF was most active in its 
lending to developing countries.  Countries in the conditionality regression include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela.  The full data set, which includes countries that 
did not borrow from the IMF, comprises 443 observations and 32 countries.  This larger sample is used in the 
program participation specification.    
6
 I also sought to explore the determinants of the number of prior actions, another element of IMF 
conditionality.   However, a large number of countries had programs where the number of prior actions equals 
zero.  As a result, the use of fixed effects reduced the sample size to a number where the models would not 
converge.  
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economics, that there tends to be less variation in beliefs among Anglo-American economists 
compared to that between Anglo-American-trained economists and those trained elsewhere, 
particularly as it relates to a theoretical core based on assumptions about rational and efficient 
markets. 
The data from Chwieroth (2013) provide detailed coding of the professional training 
characteristics of the IMF area department staff responsible for program design and the 
borrowing country chiefs of government, finance ministers, and heads of the central bank 
with primary responsibility for negotiating and implementing the program.   For the IMF I 
construct a sample of 208 area department staff members from 1983 to 1998 that was created 
from telephone directories found in the IMF Archives and supplemented by the IMF 
Communications Department.  I use these data to create a value specific to individual area 
department chains of command responsible for the design of each particular program.   This 
value enables assessment of whether variation in IMF conditionality is due in part to within-
Fund variation in normative adherence to certain tenets.  Area-specific values are generated 
for each country-year for each of the IMF departments in the sample: Africa, Asia, Europe, 
Middle East and North Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
7
        
 For borrowing country officials I construct a sample of 410 chiefs of government, 
finance ministers, and heads of the central bank from 32 developing countries from 1983 to 
1998.
8
    I identify economic policymakers from the Current World Leaders Almanac, the 
CIA’s Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments Directory and Keesings 
Record of World Events, and the websites of the finance ministries and central banks of 
                                                 
7
 The measure also takes into account the creation of two departments to manage relations with Europe 
(European 1 and European 2) and two departments to manage relations with Asia (South East and Pacific and 
Central Asia) in the 1990s.   
8
 Countries include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Korea, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.   
13 
 
various countries.   Responses to emails and faxes from some finance ministries and central 
banks supplemented these sources.  I then code whether IMF staff members and borrowing 
country officials received a Master’s degree or Ph.D. from an American or British economics 
department.   Data on professional training characteristics were obtained from Digital 
Dissertations, Index to Theses in Great Britain and Ireland, LexisNexis Executive, and 
various documentary sources (such as International Who’s Who and Who’s Who in Central 
Banking).
 9
 
 I employ these data to create three variables: (1) Anglo-American staff, which 
indicates the proportion of area department staff who received professional training in 
economics in the United States or the United Kingdom; (2) Anglo-American policy team, 
which indicates the proportion of borrowing country officials (chiefs of government, finance 
ministers, and heads of the central bank) who received professional training in economics in 
the United States or the United Kingdom; and (3) Professional ties, which is then the 
interaction effect of these two variables.    
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1 plots the mean area-specific values for the Anglo-American staff and Anglo-
American policy team variables in the 1980s and 1990s.   It shows that Anglo-American 
economists became increasingly represented across all IMF area departments in the 1990s, 
with the largest concentrations in those covering Asia and Europe.   Overall, Anglo-American 
economists also became more prevalent in borrowing country policy teams in the 1990s, 
though their concentration was highest in Europe and Latin America and over time there was 
a decline in their numbers in sub-Saharan Africa.   
The constitutive terms of the interaction, the Anglo-American staff and Anglo-
American policy team variables, assess how IMF conditionality is affected when the other 
                                                 
9
 See <http://www.lib.umi.com/dissertations/seach>; <http://www.these.com>; <http://global.lexisnexis.com/>; 
<http://www.worldwhoswho.com/>. 
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term of the interaction takes on a value of zero.    As such, the Anglo-American staff variable 
in part captures how IMF conditionality is influenced by the presence of borrowing country 
officials who do not share the staff’s beliefs.    It thus has a substantively important 
interpretation.    On the other hand, the Anglo-American policy team is statistically and 
substantively of little importance since the Anglo-American staff variable never takes on a 
value of zero in the sample.   The interaction effect itself captures the influence of shared 
professional ties between borrowing country officials and the IMF staff.   
I also control for alternative explanations found in the literature.  I consider economic 
variables that capture the technocratic considerations that may shape IMF lending.     These 
variables include a country’s reserve position, monetary conditions, overall debt, and debt 
profile.
10
   These data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  I also 
include a binary variable from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) that takes on a value of one if a 
country experienced a banking crisis.   As a proxy for global financial conditions and the 
scarcity of private international capital, I include the nominal U.S. Treasury bill rate.  These 
data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.   
I also account for political influences on IMF lending.   There is great deal of 
evidence that suggests the U.S. uses its influence within the IMF to selectively advance its 
geopolitical and financial interests.   As a proxy for the intensity of U.S. geopolitical 
interests, I follow convention in the literature by using United Nations (U.N.) voting affinity 
scores for countries vis-à-vis the United States (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Broz and Hawes 
2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007).   These scores range from -1 to 1, with higher values 
indicating closer geopolitical alignment.   I also follow other work in using country lending 
exposure data by U.S. commercial banks to proxy American financial interests (Broz and 
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 I take the natural log of the variables capturing a country’s reserve position, overall debt, and debt profile 
because each is positively skewed. 
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Hawes 2006; Stone 2008; 2011).   These data are from the Bank for International Settlements 
(2007).   
Following Vreeland (2003), I also seek to control for domestic political constraints in 
borrowing countries by including the natural log of the number of veto players.   I also 
include two dummy variables measuring left-right government partisanship as well as an 
indicator of the quality of the policymaking bureaucracy that ranges from 0 to 4, with higher 
values indicating greater quality.  The Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001) and 
the International Country Risk Guide provide these data. 
I also take into account organizational imperatives, which may lead the IMF to 
provide more lenient conditions when it has more resources available and when its member 
states are undertaking a quota review that could boost its resources.    To address these 
possibilities I use the IMF’s liquidity ratio, which is the sum of outstanding loans divided by 
total quota resources, and a dummy variable indicating the years in which a quota review is 
underway.    These data are from Dreher and Vaubel (2004).    Table 1 provides summary 
statistics for all variables, including those used in the robustness checks discussed below.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
I also take into account the issue of non-random selection, which arises from the fact 
that countries participating in IMF programs are systematically different than the overall 
population (Steinwand and Stone 2008).   I employ propensity score matching as a way to 
match each “treated” observation (a country-year with an IMF program) with a “control” 
observation (a country-year without an IMF program) based on the observed covariates that 
are as similar as possible.    This “nearest neighbour” algorithm generates a propensity score 
for each observation ranging from zero to one.  Inclusion of this propensity score, which 
captures the predicted probability of IMF program participation, helps to minimize selection 
bias    I also take into account temporal dependence by using the country-specific number of 
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years since the last IMF program, its square, and its cube (Carter and Signorino 2010).
11
  In 
the conditionality specification I replace this measure with an alternative one that captures the 
number of years since a country last borrowed from the IMF, which controls for potential 
temporal dependence in event count models (Beck et al. 1998).   
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
I estimate a logit model to produce the propensity scores included in the subsequent 
conditionality specification.   Then, since the data do not show evidence of overdispersion, I 
use a Poisson model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors to estimate the 
conditionality specification. Table 2 presents the results.
12
 
I first present a baseline model, in which I exclude the professional characteristics 
variables.   I then introduce the professional characteristics variables in subsequent models.    
Models 1 and 2 explore the pattern of IMF program participation.  While there is an extensive 
literature on the subject, it is a less theoretically appropriate dependent variable since requests 
for financing are rarely rejected. Macroeconomic factors related to large public sector debt 
burdens appear to influence country participation in IMF loans.   Professional ties between 
the staff and borrowing country officials, U.S. geopolitical and financial interests, and 
organizational imperatives do not appear significant at the selection stage.  
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 report the results of alternative specifications of the 
conditionality regressions.   Some of the control variables are significant in the expected 
direction.    The IMF appears less likely to impose stringent conditionality when a borrower 
government faces more veto players.   There is also evidence that organizational imperatives 
surrounding quota reviews increase the stringency of conditionality, which may be due to 
                                                 
11
 The results are similar for the program participation specification if I instead use the cubic splines approach of 
Beck et al. (1998); and for the subsequent conditionality specification if I instead: (1) exclude the propensity 
score; (2) include a count of the number of years; (3) include a measure of debt outstanding to the IMF as a 
proportion of a country’s IMF quota; and (4) include year fixed effects. 
12
 The results of the country fixed effects are not shown.   
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efforts on the part of the staff to present themselves as a responsible manager of IMF 
resources (Copelovitch 2010:62n33).   
The results do not provide support to those who suggest U.S. interests have a decisive 
influence on IMF conditionality. This result may be due to distributional conflict among IMF 
member states seeking different policy outcomes, with the U.S. unable to prevail in securing 
more lenient treatment in countries where its interests are intense, but where other leading 
member states have weaker interests and oppose such action on moral hazard grounds 
(Copelovitch, 2010).   None of the other control variables manage to attain statistical 
significance. 
The results do provide strong support for the argument offered here.  As expected, the 
results from Model 4 indicate that the coefficient on Anglo-American staff variable is 
positively and significantly related to the number of performance criteria.   However since it 
appears in this specification as an interaction with Anglo-American policy team, it is difficult 
to assess the magnitude and significance of its effect from the coefficient alone.   The 
preferred method to interpret the effect of interaction terms and the constitutive variables is 
through graphical presentation of the relationship between changes in the variables 
constituting the interaction term and the outcome of interest (Brambor et al. 2006; Berry et al. 
2012).    
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
I therefore use Figure 2 to plot the marginal effect of Anglo-American staff as Anglo-
American policy team varies from its minimum to maximum values.    The figure also 
includes a histogram illustrating the distribution of the Anglo-American policy team variable.  
Figure 2 shows a statistically significant effect for Anglo-American staff, but only at the 
lower end of the distribution of Anglo-American policy team.  The marginal effect of Anglo-
American staff declines in magnitude and statistical significance as Anglo-American policy 
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team increases.  At the left end of the graph, weaker professional ties to borrowing country 
officials lead the IMF staff to increase the number of binding conditions, whereas at the right 
end of the graph there is no evidence to suggest stronger professional ties have a statistically 
or substantively significant effect.    The histogram shows that there are a sizeable number of 
observations that fall in the range of statistical significance. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 3 provides a sense of the magnitude of this effect by presenting substantive 
quantities of interest that illustrate the impact of a one standard deviation increase in Anglo-
American policy staff, conditional on varying levels of Anglo-American policy team, holding 
all other variables constant at the means.   This table of first differences thus shows the 
predicted change in the number of performance criteria as Anglo-American policy team 
increases.   As the quantities illustrate, a one standard deviation increase in Anglo-American 
staff, leads to a substantial tightening in IMF conditionality but only at low levels of Anglo-
American policy team.  The effect at the minimum value of Anglo-American policy team is 
found to exceed that exerted from a one standard deviation increase in the veto player 
measure and from the presence of an IMF quota review.     
These results are consistent with the argument that the staff tighten conditionality 
when borrowing country officials appear unsympathetic to IMF policy goals.    Empirical 
examples are provided by IMF negotiations with Argentina in the mid-1980s and Egypt in the 
late 1990s.
13
    In each of these cases the staff applied strict treatment to government officials, 
with whom they shared few professional ties, because of doubts as to their commitment to 
IMF policy goals (Boughton, 2001; Momani, 2004).  Both programs ended in failure.          
                                                 
13
 In Argentina (1984), Anglo-American staff was 52.95 and Anglo-American policy team was 0.   In Egypt 
(1996), Anglo-American staff was 53.85 and Anglo-American policy team was 0.    In each case, the IMF 
approved loans (Argentina: 10 conditions; Egypt: 7 conditions) that were more stringent than those provided in 
the mean borrowing country. 
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Stronger alignment of policy goals, as suggested by the presence of professional ties, 
does not appear to lead borrowers to receive lenient treatment.   What accounts for this 
finding?   One possibility is to consider how, in addition to normative orientations, concerns 
about time-inconsistency and moral hazard also shape staff behavior.   These concerns 
generate serious misgivings about more lenient conditionality since it would provide any 
government (present or future) with greater discretion to reverse policy reforms and assume 
greater risk.  More stringent conditionality arising from weaker normative adherence aligns 
with these concerns.   More lenient conditionality originating from stronger normative 
adherence does not.   
While larger loans carry rejection costs that provide an incentive for any present or 
future government to act in accordance with IMF policy goals (Vreeland 2003), more lenient 
conditionality would provide a government with greater capacity to act independently and 
thus assume additional risk since the conditionality contract could not be easily rewritten.  In 
addition, reformist officials sharing IMF policy goals may oppose more lenient treatment as a 
way of binding the opposition (both in the present and the future) (Vreeland 2003).   These 
influences thus weigh against more lenient treatment for borrowers where officials appear 
sympathetic to IMF policy goals, thus offsetting the effect of stronger normative adherence.  
As a result, we observe stronger professional ties having no statistically or substantively 
significant effect on the design of conditionality.    
The IMF negotiations with Indonesia in the late 1990s provide an empirical example.   
Here, despite shared professional ties, rather than providing more lenient treatment, IMF and 
some country officials worked together to design a loan that would bind opposing elements in 
the government to policy reform and that led the number of binding conditions to conform to 
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other loans provided at the time (Stone, 2011: 170-173; IEO, 2003:12-13).
14
  This suggests 
that while the IMF staff prioritize their normative orientations, they also give due 
consideration to other concerns that may weigh against providing more lenient treatment.   
The IMF staff and borrowing country officials may also share a preference for limiting the 
scope for future governments to abandon their policy goals (Vreeland 2003). 
As suggested earlier, much of the existing literature depicts IMF conditionality as a 
reflection of preferences of powerful member states and IMF management.   Thus, it is worth 
considering the extent to which these findings may reflect these preferences.    Management, 
which is often seen as agent of powerful member states, may be broadly supportive of 
conditionality designed on the basis identified in the results, but it also faces additional 
incentives to seek excessive insurance against failure in all programs (Willett 2002).   This 
may bias management to err on the side of working to streamline conditionality so as to 
increase the likelihood of program success, even in cases where professional ties are weak. 
Thus, if management does err on the side of seeking to encourage the staff to limit 
conditionality for all borrowers, the results are inconsistent with this expectation.   However, 
the results are in line with Momani’s (2005b) finding that management efforts to streamline 
conditionality prior to the recent global financial crisis failed largely due to their lack of 
resonance with the organization’s normative orientations.15 
Powerful states, for their part, are likely to be broadly supportive of using 
conditionality to encourage policy reform, particularly in cases where the intentions of 
country officials do not appear to align with the policy goals of the IMF and where their 
geopolitical and financial interests are less intense.   For instance, some suggest that during 
                                                 
14
 In Indonesia (1997/1998), Anglo-American staff was 60/65 and Anglo-American policy team was 66.6/66.6.   
The IMF approved loans with 10 (1997) and 9 (1998) binding conditions that showed little deviation from those 
loans provided to the mean borrowing country during the Asian financial crisis.   
15
 The IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2007b:24) also finds ‘there is no evidence of a reduction in the 
number of structural conditions following the introduction of the streamlining initiative.’ 
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the Cold War socialist and leftist governments received tougher conditionality (Hayter 1971; 
Payer 1974).  Thus, in some countries, the influence and inclination of powerful countries 
and the staff to apply more stringent conditionality may co-exist and be difficult to 
disentangle.    The strong version of this argument is that powerful countries push the staff to 
tighten conditionality against “unfavourable” governments, while the weak version of this 
argument is that the staff take into account the preferences of powerful states and then act in 
accordance with them.   
I use various measures of the intensity of member state preferences as way to help 
disentangle their impact on staff behaviour.  Using these measures there is at best weak 
evidence to support the conjecture that the results partially reflect statist influence to 
discriminate against “unfavourable” governments in countries where the interests of powerful 
states are weak.   In the sample there are 59 cases in which Anglo-American staff takes on a 
higher value (above its median) and Anglo-American policy team takes on values at the low 
end of its distribution where the effect is significant in Figure 2.  These cases cluster in Latin 
America (37 cases) and the Middle East and North Africa (12 cases), with Uruguay (1997), 
Venezuela (1996), Egypt (1996) and Jordan (1996) as recent examples.  Yet most of these 
cases are not particularly collinear with weak U.S. geopolitical and financial interests.   U.S. 
geopolitical interests, as measured by the U.N. voting affinity measure, are weak (in the first 
quartile) in only fourteen of the 59 cases, while its financial interests are of low intensity, 
including one where its geopolitical interests are also weak, in only nine of the 59 cases.      
The voting affinity measure also likely overstates the number of cases in which U.S. 
geopolitical interests are actually weak, since a number of these cases, such as Egypt (1991) 
and the Philippines (1986, 1986, 1989, 1991, and 1998), play important roles in U.S. foreign 
policy but generally vote against it in the U.N. General Assembly  (Stone 2011:165-166).   In 
many of the cases where professional ties are weak it is thus easier to conclude that staff 
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motivations for seeking reform may be stronger than statist pressure to impose more binding 
conditionality.  In fact, in some of these cases, such as Egypt, U.S. officials insisted, despite 
staff objections, for greater leniency to be given in the design of conditionality (Momani 
2004).      
 I also carry out a number of tests to assess the robustness of these results.   First, I 
consider alternative measures of U.S. interests that feature in the literature, such as U.S. 
military aid, economic aid, and exports.
16
  Second, I also consider measures of the 
geopolitical and financial interests of other leading IMF member states, including Britain, 
France, Germany, and Japan.   Third, following Achen (2005), I consider a reduced-form 
specification that includes only the two control variables that were found to be significant in 
Table 2.  As Table 4 shows, the sign and significance of the Anglo-American staff coefficient 
does not change in any of these specifications.  
 I also assess whether the results may be contingent on regime type.   I use two 
different measures of democracy; one from Polity IV, another from Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland (CGV) (2009) to identify regime type.   I then divide the sample into democratic 
and non-democratic countries, which greatly depletes the number of observations and only 
permits estimation of the reduced-form specification.   The results from this limited 
examination provide some evidence that the finding holds in both democratic and non-
democratic regimes.     
Taken together, all of these results provide strong confirmation that the design of IMF 
conditionality depends in part on the extent to which staff and borrowing country officials 
share professional ties.   These results are in line with the arguments offered here.    
                                                 
16
 The data on U.S. military aid is from the Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project.   
The OECD’s Statistical Compendium provides the data on U.S. economic aid.   U.S. trade data is from the 
IMF’s Direction of Trade.   
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Normative adherence appears to be a crucial determinant of conditionality, particularly in 
borrowers where country officials seem unsympathetic to IMF policy goals.  
CONCLUSION 
 Much of the recent literature on IMF conditionality has focused on shining light on 
the degree to which member states exert influence over IMF lending.   Yet, while insightful, 
this literature often provides a somewhat narrow depiction of the role the staff play in 
designing IMF programs.  When their role is considered, in most cases the staff are depicted 
either as technocrats who design programs based on economic models and data, or as 
bureaucratic actors who respond to organizational imperatives.    
While not denying the importance of these factors, this article offers a new argument 
and evidence that points to the IMF’s organizational culture and staff professional training as 
also having a critical influence on the design of IMF programs.   Others have investigated 
various related questions about organizational culture and the inner workings of the IMF, but 
we thus far have little systematic analysis as to how these factors shape the design of 
conditionality.  This article shows that weak professional ties between the staff and 
borrowing country officials lead to the application of more stringent conditionality.    Yet, 
interestingly, professional ties, while helping to bind individuals together around a set of 
shared beliefs, do not make the application of conditionality less binding.   Staff concerns 
about time-inconsistency and moral hazard may offset the inclination to play favorites due to 
stronger normative adherence. 
These findings have several important implications for studies of IMF conditionality 
and IOs more generally.   First, it extends the body of literature that takes seriously the role of 
organizational culture and internal dynamics as an important influence on IO behaviour 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005b; Weaver 2008; Broome 2010; Chwieroth 
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2010).   It moves beyond simply asserting “professional identity matters” by identifying some 
mechanisms through which it is likely to be influential.    
Second, with its emphasis on normative orientations and cultural predispositions, 
rather than formal rules and procedures, this study also contributes to the recent behavioural 
turn in the study of IOs that emphasizes informal governance (Stone 2011; Kleine 2013).    
The analysis here shows that informal governance operates in IOs not, as much of this recent 
behavioural literature suggests, simply via state influence but also through the evolving 
configuration, incentive structure, and normative orientations of their staffs.   The analysis 
also confirms the logic of arguments about the manner in which epistemic communities 
(Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992), network ties (Kahler 2009); linked ecologies (Seabrooke 
and Tsingou 2009), and normative resonance (Cortell and Davis 1996; 2000; Johnston 2008) 
shape the terms of international cooperation.    It also raises questions about precisely how 
and under what conditions governments may use cabinet appointments to lessen the 
stringency of conditional lending.   For instance, recent developments, such as the 
appointment of Lucas Papademos as Greece’s prime minister in November 2011, can be 
interpreted in part as an effort to ease relations with official creditors by signalling stronger 
normative adherence.  
By shining light on how normative orientations of the staff co-exist with other factors 
shaping IMF conditionality, this article suggests that a fuller understanding of how IOs work 
requires close attention to evolving normative orientations of their staffs.    Indeed, if 
normative orientations and professional ties matter for IMF lending, they also likely matter 
for other forms of conditional lending and for other IOs.    Conditional bilateral lending, such 
as the Millennium Challenge Account, also may be susceptible to the influences outlined here 
(Parks 2012).  Professional ties also likely matter for other IOs, such as the World Health 
Organization and the World Trade Organization.   Although previous research demonstrates 
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that professional ties shape the content of these organization’s policy prescriptions (Cortell 
and Peterson 2006), this study suggests these ties may also influence terms by which they 
interact with member states.
17
  For instance, professional ties may bias the forecasts of these 
and other IOs in the same way that member state interests and other factors have been shown 
to shape those of the IMF (Dreher et al. 2008).     
A third, related implication is that normative orientations condition the relationship 
between IOs and domestic policy reform.    The intrusiveness of IMF conditionality is in a 
part of function of the normative orientations of the staff and borrowing country officials.   
These orientations thus play an important part in strengthening our understanding of how IOs 
shape economic and political outcomes by empowering reformers and marginalizing 
opponents (Vreeland 2003; Woods 2006; Dai 2010).     
 The findings here also speak to policy discussions about the IMF.  Critics of the IMF 
are likely to view the findings as supporting their claim that conditionality is biased in its 
application of a one-size-fits-all logic that lacks sensitivity to contextual features varying 
across borrowers.  To the extent that conditionality is more stringent for borrowers with 
officials who appear unsympathetic to IMF policy goals, then it suggests conditionality may 
suffer from a normative bias and that the policy space of some borrowers may therefore be 
unduly more severely constrained than others.    
The findings here suggest this asymmetric treatment may not, as is commonly 
depicted, result from statist influence alone.   Normative orientations and cultural dispositions 
of the IMF also appear important.    These orientations and dispositions may be consistent 
with the interests of powerful states but this does not mean they are attributable solely to 
them.   As Woods (2006:56) observes, “[The] set of ideas [shared by the Fund staff] is not a 
                                                 
17
 See also Fang and Stone (2012).   
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direct reflection of the interests of the most powerful members of the organization, even 
though powerful members get to influence it.” 
Finally, the findings here have interesting implications for understanding IMF lending 
since the global financial crisis, including its involvement in the Eurozone.    The IMF has 
seen remarkable changes in its policy beliefs since signs of the crisis first emerged in 2007.   
The Fund has not become a stronghold of heterodox economic convictions.    But it has 
become increasingly tolerant, even acceptant of policy measures, such as capital controls, that 
were once considered heresy (Grabel 2011; 2014; Chwieroth 2013b; 2014).
18
   As such, the 
argument here would lead us to expect greater flexibility in IMF lending to the extent that the 
Fund has broadened the range of policy goals it deems appropriate.   
In fact, since the onset of the crisis the IMF has reduced the number of structural 
conditions in its loans (IMF 2011b; 2011c).
19
    While the number of quantitative 
performance criteria has remained stable since 2002, the discontinuation of structural 
performance criteria in 2009 has led to some progress in streamlining conditionality.   
Nonetheless, the number and depth of conditions in loans to Eurozone countries (especially 
Greece) has increased compared to other recent borrowers.   
In addition to the interests of powerful shareholders, such as Germany, the 
involvement of the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), which 
together with the IMF form the so called “Troika,” has complicated the design of 
conditionality and financial rescue packages in the Eurozone.  The IMF, as the junior partner 
contributing the smallest share of resources, has had to coordinate with these actors and work 
to accommodate their preferences.   Among these various actors, Germany, the Commission, 
and the ECB have offered much stronger support of “Washington Consensus”-style policies 
than the IMF staff (Lütz and Kranke 2013).  The IMF’s lending policies in the Europe (and 
                                                 
18
 For an opposing view, see Cline, Ford, and Vernengo (2010) and Gabor (2012).   
19
 See Nelson (2014a) for a skeptical view of recent IMF streamlining of its lending programs.    
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elsewhere) have been more flexible and, at least compared to past crises and to those policies 
endorsed by key actors in Europe, also less contractionary (IMF 2009; 2011a; see also 
Edwards and Hsieh 2011; Kattel and Raudla 2013:432fn13; 440; Lütz and Kranke 2013).
20
      
The Fund has not adopted an “anything goes” orientation in the Eurozone or 
elsewhere, and the extent of its normative change remains tentative and piecemeal (Weisbrot 
et al. 2009; Van Waeyenberge et al. 2010; Grabel 2011).     Yet the characterization of the 
IMF as a one-size-fits-all promoter of orthodox economic policies seems outdated.   Recent 
developments suggest that the normative orientations of the IMF staff remain a critical 
determinant of the design of conditionality.  Incremental normative change within the Fund, 
such as that featured in Chwieroth (2013b) and Vetterlein and Moschella (2014), may 
enhance policy space for borrowers, even while co-financing operations with powerful 
shareholders and regional institutions like the Commission and ECB may complicate the 
application of greater flexibility in particular countries.   
 
 
    
  
                                                 
20
 For an alternative view, see Grabel (2011:821); Van Waeyenberge et al. (2010); and Weisbrot et al. (2009).  
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Figure 2.  Performance Criteria: Interaction Effect 
 
 
 
Dash lines represent 95 percent confidence interval. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics.   
 
Variable Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Performance Criteria 81 5.94 2.03 0 14 
Anglo-American Staff 443 50.34 8.48 26.67 77.78 
Anglo-American Policy Team 443 21.59 27.96 0 100 
Reserves / Imports (log) 443 1.17 .791 -4.45 2.51 
Money Supply / Reserves 443 7.21 24.18 .0006 461.07 
Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt / GDP (log) 443 3.72 .695 1.66 6.42 
Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt / Exports 
(log) 
443 2.82 .661 -1.32 5.02 
Short-term Debt / Total Debt (log) 443 2.49 .709 -.183 3.83 
Banking Crisis 443 .334 .472 0 1 
U.S. Treasury Rate 443 5.85 1.70 3.02 9.57 
US UN Affinity 443 -.045 .181 -.298 .8837 
US Bank Exposure 443 1.71 2.85 .0007 14.08 
Checks (log) 443 .859 .629 0 2.89 
Right 
Government 
443 .318 .466 0 1 
Left  
Government 
443 .209 .408 0 1 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
443 1.69 1.00 0 4 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
443 30.7 7.18 20 42 
Quota Review 443 .661 .473 0 1 
U.S. Military Aid 443 75.22 255.49 0 1366.7 
U.S. Economic Aid 443 109.37 202.67 0 1395.3 
U.S. Exports / GDP 443 5.32 4.32 .088 18.7 
UK UN Affinity 443 .514 .126 .189 .969 
UK Bank Exposure 411 .852 1.33 .004 7.37 
France UN Affinity 443 .622 .111 .381 .938 
France Bank Exposure 443 1.04 1.38 .0005 8.04 
Germany UN Affinity 443 .725 .089 .535 1 
Germany Bank Exposure 423 .853 1.27 .002 7.89 
Japan UN Affinity 443 .843 .067 .655 1 
Japan Bank Exposure 362 1.08 1.65 .0002 9.59 
IMF Years 443 4.86 5.06 0 32 
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Table 2. Covariates of IMF loan commitments, 1983– 1998 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Program Program Conditionality Conditionality 
    
 
  
 Anglo-American Staff 
 
-0.00205 
 
0.0222*** 
  
(0.0258) 
 
(0.00808) 
Anglo-American Policy Team 
 
0.00726 
 
0.0202* 
  
(0.0347) 
 
(0.0112) 
Professional Ties 
 
-3.78e-05 
 
-0.000338* 
  
(0.000684) 
 
(0.000179) 
Reserves / Imports (log) -0.240 -0.235 -0.119 -0.0742 
 
(0.258) (0.258) (0.136) (0.124) 
Money Supply / Reserves -0.0332 -0.0323 0.00318 0.00572 
 
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.00857) (0.0134) 
Public Debt / GDP (log) 0.409* 0.438* -0.0211 0.0180 
 
-0.254 (0.260) (0.154) (0.183) 
Public Debt/ Exports (log) 0.0939 0.0821 0.0703 0.0342 
 
(0.251) (0.253) (0.0615) (0.0747) 
Short-Term Debt / Total Debt (log) -0.0448 -0.0633 0.0461 -0.0148 
 
(0.219) (0.220) (0.0690) (0.0903) 
Banking Crisis -0.0235 -0.0575 0.00298 -0.0471 
 
(0.291) (0.296) (0.0778) (0.0960) 
U.S. Treasury Rate 0.0129 0.0210 0.000872 0.00245 
 
(0.0907) (0.0919) (0.0271) (0.0255) 
U.S. UN Affinity -0.00292 -0.00374 -0.000321 -0.00281 
 
(0.00845) (0.00856) (0.00186) (0.00230) 
U.S. Bank Exposure 0.00924 -0.0144 -0.0535 -0.0574 
 
(0.0478) (0.0549) (0.0430) (0.0471) 
Checks (log) -0.0124 0.00215 -0.132** -0.245*** 
 
(0.243) (0.250) (0.0648) (0.0859) 
Right Government 0.445 0.503 -0.0356 -0.0317 
 
(0.368) (0.395) (0.0896) (0.112) 
Left Government -0.520 -0.457 0.0681 0.0915 
 
(0.394) (0.409) (0.232) (0.251) 
Bureaucratic Quality 0.0911 0.0892 -0.0643 -0.0710 
 
(0.144) (0.147) (0.0477) (0.0438) 
Liquidity Ratio 1.028 1.235 0.228 0.312 
 
(2.350) (2.382) (0.618) (0.830) 
Quota Review -0.165 -0.138 0.109* 0.139** 
 
(0.319) (0.320) (0.0642) (0.0644) 
IMF Years -0.0233 -0.0257 -0.00218 -0.0119 
 
(0.0914) (0.0925) (0.00703) (0.00744) 
IMF Years (square) -0.00570 -0.00552 
  
 
(0.00741) (0.00746) 
  IMF Years (cube) 0.000144 0.000140 
  
 
(0.000137) (0.000137) 
  
 
(1.685) (2.224) 
  Propensity Score 
  
0.516 0.414 
   
(0.732) (0.983) 
     Observations 443 443 74 74 
Groups 31 31 20 20     
39 
 
Log Likelihood -200.92276     -200.48079    -95.993107  -94.856868 
 
 
*p<.10, **p<.05.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  IMF Years: Years since Last IMF Program.  
     
 
 
Table 3.  First Differences 
 
Predicted Number of Performance Criteria, All Variables at Means:  8.09 
Values of Anglo-American Policy Team  Predicted Change in Number of  
Performance Criteria 
Policy Team = 0 (min) 2.21** 
Policy Team = 33  0.586** 
Policy Team = 66  0.084 
Policy Team = 100 (max) -0.043 
 
Veto Players -1.03** 
Quota Review 1.10** 
 
Note: The first four quantities show the impact of a one standard deviation increase in Anglo-American policy 
staff.   The fifth quantity shows the impact of a one standard deviation increase in Checks (log).   The sixth 
quantity shows the impact when Quota Review takes the value of one (i.e., present in that year).  Asterisks 
indicate significance at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table 4. Covariates of IMF conditionality, 1983– 1998 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
U.S. Mil 
Aid 
U.S. Econ 
Aid 
U.S. 
Exports U.K. France Germany Japan 
Reduced-
Form 
Dem - 
Polity Dem - CGV Non-Dem - Polity 
Non-Dem - 
CGV 
                          
Anglo-American Staff 0.0208** 0.0200** 0.0194** 0.0187** 0.0188** 0.0157* 0.0305*** 0.00898* 0.0110** 0.00981* 0.0157* 0.0238* 
 
(0.00896) (0.00839) (0.00805) (0.00900) (0.00787) (0.00936) (0.0108) (0.00542) (0.00529) (0.00548) (0.0095) (0.0144) 
Anglo-American Policy Team 0.0177 0.0182 0.0190* 0.00844 0.0179 0.0125 0.0231 0.00500 0.00976 0.00746 0.0162*** 0.0421* 
 
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0151) (0.00858) (0.00826) (0.00840) (0.00611) (0.0251) 
Professional Ties -0.000293 -0.000302 -0.000310* -0.000121 -0.000296 -0.000162 -0.000392 -9.47e-05 -0.000256* -0.000204 -0.000136 -0.000395 
 
(0.000181) (0.000191) (0.000183) (0.000214) (0.000205) (0.000216) (0.000259) (0.000139) (0.000142) (0.000143) (0.000107) (0.000257) 
Reserves / Imports (log) -0.103 -0.118 -0.126 -0.0960 -0.109 -0.231** -0.281*** 
     
 
(0.124) (0.121) (0.125) (0.112) (0.104) (0.109) (0.0905) 
     Money Supply / Reserves 0.000840 0.000611 -0.00127 0.0112 -0.00803 -0.0152 -0.00439 
     
 
(0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0141) (0.0120) (0.0107) (0.00965) (0.0104) 
     Public Debt / GDP (log) 0.0871 0.0878 0.103 -0.0125 0.106 0.141 0.323** 
     
 
(0.180) (0.183) (0.177) (0.182) (0.172) (0.130) (0.145) 
     Public Debt/ Exports (log) 0.0387 0.0214 0.0611 0.0135 0.0183 0.0253 0.0926 
     
 
(0.0864) (0.0772) (0.0830) (0.0790) (0.101) (0.0811) (0.105) 
     Short-Term Debt / Total Debt 
(log) 0.00224 0.000899 0.000513 -0.0530 0.0153 0.00599 -0.191 
     
 
(0.0912) (0.0935) (0.0877) (0.118) (0.0928) (0.0911) (0.147) 
     Banking Crisis -0.0494 -0.0320 -0.0480 -0.0632 -0.117 -0.155 -0.0721 
     
 
(0.0928) (0.0993) (0.0940) (0.0786) (0.0934) (0.108) (0.0966) 
     U.S. Treasury Rate 0.0145 0.0119 0.0158 -0.00246 0.0225 0.0163 0.0208 
     
 
(0.0232) (0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0357) (0.0274) (0.0233) (0.0536) 
     U.S. Military Aid -0.000338 
           
 
(0.00104) 
           U.S. Economic Aid 
 
-1.173 
          
  
(1.743) 
          U.S. Exports / GDP 
  
-0.000507 
         
   
(0.000459) 
          Bank Exposure -0.0493 -0.0505 -0.0523 0.113* 0.139** 0.196** 0.0638 
     
 
(0.0417) (0.0420) (0.0373) (0.0652) (0.0697) (0.0815) (0.0432) 
     U.N. Affinity 
   
-0.124 0.482 0.600* 0.969 
     
    
(0.745) (0.635) (0.361) (2.199) 
     Checks (log) -0.222** -0.226*** -0.220*** -0.279*** -0.243*** -0.229*** -0.368*** -0.125* 0.00724 -0.0140 0.461*** 
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(0.0910) (0.0842) (0.0845) (0.0897) (0.0788) (0.0826) (0.118) (0.0649) (0.0627) (0.0484) (0.00726) 
 Right Government -0.0963 -0.0875 -0.0681 -0.110 -0.351*** -0.196* -0.105 
     
 
(0.0920) (0.102) (0.0869) (0.130) (0.133) (0.106) (0.208) 
     Left Government -0.0465 -0.0363 -0.0794 0.126 -0.259 -0.0899 -0.143 
     
 
(0.225) (0.260) (0.211) (0.427) (0.237) (0.240) (0.363) 
     Bureaucratic Quality -0.0727 -0.0629 -0.0963* -0.0466 -0.0617 -0.0420 -0.0698** 
     
 
(0.0524) (0.0501) (0.0577) (0.0428) (0.0405) (0.0451) (0.0352) 
     Liquidity Ratio 0.236 0.114 0.480 -0.873 0.0644 0.107 -1.129 
     
 
(0.819) (0.883) (0.836) (0.628) (0.606) (0.609) (0.783) 
     Quota Review 0.120* 0.117* 0.124* 0.147** 0.135** 0.138*** -0.0368 0.0352 0.0974* 0.0960* 0.117 0.0763 
 
(0.0679) (0.0685) (0.0716) (0.0649) (0.0562) (0.0467) (0.142) (0.0550) (0.0553) (0.0518) (0.0792) (0.0725) 
Last Loan -0.00867 -0.00846 -0.00921 -0.0133 -0.00751 -0.00859 -0.0201* 
     
 
(0.00808) (0.00804) (0.00806) (0.00943) (0.00600) (0.00619) (0.0108) 
     Propensity Score 0.196 0.215 -0.195 1.091 0.323 0.380 -0.962 
     
 
(1.004) (1.178) (1.036) (1.360) (0.791) (0.795) (0.841) 
     
             Observations 74 74 74 70 74 71 64 81 46 51 26 24 
Groups 20 20 20 20 20 19 17 22 11 13 9 8 
Log Likelihood -94.959745  -94.951443 -94.765564 -87.403459    -94.853293 -90.608003 -82.477412 -105.04763 -59.374181 -64.217573   -28.575122 -28.263349 
 
 
Veto players is time-invariant in the non-democratic CGV specification and thus the inclusion of fixed effects excludes this variable from the model.   
 
*p<.10, **p<.05.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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